Private banks in Karnataka lead in NPAs

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The non-performing assets (NPAs) of all banks, in Karnataka,from 28 lakh accounts was ₹57,070.02 crore as on September 30, 2020.

“Among the sectors with high NPAs was agriculture at ₹17,772.87 crore (from 12.20 lakh accounts), other priority sector advances was ₹11,470.07 crore (4.20 lakh accounts) and non-priority sector advances was ₹17,096.27 crore (7.73 lakh accounts),” a senior official at Karnataka State Level Bankers’ Committee (SLBC) said.

Among the private banks, NPAs in Lakshmi Vilas Bank was ₹2,979.10 crore from 15,190 accounts, while those from Yes Bank was₹4,675.23 crore from 946 accounts.

Among the lead banks category, Canara Bank’s total NPAs stood at ₹12,531.66 crore (with 3.41 lakh accounts), State Bank of India at ₹11,663.58 crore (7.37 lakh accounts). Punjab National Bank with ₹4,121.52 crore (12,735 accounts) and Bank of India ₹1,069.85 crore (19,477 accounts).

“SLBC has requested the Karnataka government to provide guidance and assistance for the recovery of bad loans,” the official said.

On the recovery front, banks in the State have recovered ₹460.87 crore so far under Sarfaesi, DRT and Lok Adalats Acts. The recoveries under Sarfaesi were ₹114.25 crore, Debts Recovery Tribunals (DRT) at ₹335.19 crore and Lok Adalat at ₹11.43 crore.

Poor loan disbursal

On September quarter, the banks have disbursed education loans of ₹650 crore, covering 30,102 students, as against the annual financial target of ₹7,725 crore under both priority and non-priority segments.

According to the official, “The performance of banks in lending under education loans, as the percentage of achievement v/s target, was 8.41 per cent. This poor loan disbursal was mainly due to the education sector getting affected due to the Covid-19 pandemic.”

“During the SLBC meet in December 2020, member banks were told to sanction more education loans to eligible students to achieve the target,” he added.

Due to record rains and flooding in the State, banks were asked to restructure loans in natural calamity-affected districts. After the revenue department submitted crop-wise loss data for September quarter, about 230 accounts amounting to ₹5.15 crore were re-structured.

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RBI: Banks’ asset quality can deteriorate

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The Reserve Bank of India’s Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India in 2019-20 has cautioned that the asset quality of the banking system may deteriorate sharply, going forward, due to uncertainty induced by Covid-19 and its real economic impact. Gross non-performing assets ratio was at 7.5 per cent at end September 2020, which the report said veils the strong undercurrent of slippage.

“The accretion to NPAs as per the Reserve Bank’s Income Recognition and Asset Classification (IRAC) norms would have been higher in the absence of the asset quality standstill provided as a Covid-19 relief measure,” it further said. Significantly, the quantum of GNPAs of banks had declined for the second consecutive year to 8.2 per cent at end March 2020 from 9.1 per cent in end March 2019.

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DFIs 2.0: Grappling with growing expectations

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The “Terminator” was a super-efficient fighting machine till, afflicted by the ravages of continuous strife, it had to exit but departed with an ominous, “I’ll be back!” In a different context today, these words power the discussion around reviving the once mighty Development Finance Institutions (DFIs).

In her last Budget speech, Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman proposed to set up DFIs for promoting infrastructure funding. About 7,000 projects were identified under the National Infrastructure Pipeline (NIP) with projected investment of a whopping ₹111-lakh crore during 2020-25.

The proposed DFI would play a key developmental role, apart from providing conventional innovative financial mechanisms.

DFIs: The Fallen Stars

The DFIs of the pre and early liberalisation era could be broadly categorised as all-India or state/regional/functional institutions depending on their geographical or specialised coverage. Despite their undeniable contribution to the growth of infrastructure and industrial sectors after independence, the role of DFIs as the future lodestars of development began to be questioned in the post liberalisation period.

In the 1990s, following economic liberalisation and a spurt in economic activity, DFIs suffered huge NPAs, with many sliding to actual or near unviable status. It was also noted that (Desai-1999) the DFIs had failed in several crucial areas.

They financed industrial groups rather than new entrepreneurs, diluted the standard of scrutiny of proposals, had weak project/ implementation monitoring skills, etc. The report also noted that DFIs had inherited a bureaucratic attitude, which prevented a comprehensive achievement of their founding objectives.

Judged in these terms, although the quantity of funds that flowed through these channels was huge, DFIs failed to create dependable resources by way of funds and skills to accelerate the tempo of industrial and infrastructure development.

This state of affairs confronted the two Narasimham Committee on Financial Sector Reforms in the 1990s which noted that the DFIs may not be viable, since these institutions were raising funds at the current market rates and lending to businesses with long gestation and often high risk of failure with high credit cost.

Accordingly, the committee recommended that the DFIs be converted either into banks or NBFCs and should be subject to the full rigour of RBI regulations as applicable to the respective categories. Consequently, both ICICI and IDBI were converted into commercial banks and IFCI into an NBFC.

It was also felt that since the banking system had acquired skills in managing credit risks in different sectors, including the long-term finance and capital market, they were better placed to finance the corporate sector from their relatively vast pool of low-cost funds.

DFI: Resurrection?

Unfortunately, the effort to pass the development finance baton to banks was equally ill-starred. Banks lend out of deposits collected from many small and large depositors.

They normally have relatively short savings horizons and would prefer to focus on liquidity and safety as against high returns. Further, lending for infrastructure development requires making lumpy investments on the one hand and allocating large sums to single borrowers, with resultant higher risks of non-recovery and illiquidity, on the other.

Efforts by banks to operate within acceptable exposure tenures of 10-12 years often resulted in pressure on borrowers to artificially reduce the project completion time at the cost of viability.

In order to address the issue, RBI introduced a flexible financing 5:25 scheme in July 2014, allowing banks to extend long-term loans of 20-25 years to match the cash flow of projects, while refinancing them every five or seven years.

However, the emerging stressed assets crisis, aggravated by an inadequacy of skills, adversely impacted the banks’ capacity to make the desired impact.

This has brought us back, full circle, to the need for specialised financial institutions to carry the developmental agenda forward.

I’ll be back! – But in what form?

India is standing at the threshold of an industrial revolution. The fear, however, is that the current trend may reverse abruptly, as in the mid-1990s, and we may be stuck in the lower 5-6 per cent growth rut.

DFIs or multilateral development banks have been a feature of the global economic system since the early days of post-World War II reconstruction.

Over these last seven decades, however, there has been a perceptible shift in the global economic architecture, particularly evident in the increasing share of the global economic pie commanded by countries such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa.

There is a growing reliance on domestic resources for public investment across all these nations while professional expertise in development and policy planning are being globalised.

It is against this backdrop that the role of the proposed ‘new’ DFI should be assessed. The need to effectively combine financial/technical approaches with the unique features of their geographical footprint and client base is necessary. The New Development Bank (NDB) and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the world’s youngest DFIs with participation from India, are a step in this direction.

The extent of private collaboration, is another issue being deliberated globally.

Closer home, the proposed ‘new’ DFI, could build with agreed sets of principles for creating buy-in for innovative financing mechanisms, introduce blended finance, adopt a portfolio approach in which a number of projects are aggregated for a broader funding participation, greater collaboration with last-mile players and other national development banks.

As private players increasingly focus on sustainability and impact investing, DFIs must continuously evolve to support business models that mainstream investors may not yet be comfortable with.

The work of DFIs isn’t likely to get easier, because of rising expectations and emerging competition from alternate funding sources like Global FIs, Capital Markets and governments themselves.

The proposal for specialised term finance institution(s) to cope with the aftermath of Covid induced economic disruptions and development imperatives, presents interesting opportunities for Indian DFIs in their new avatars.

The writer is CGM (Retd), SBI and former CEO, Indian Institute of Insolvency Professionals of ICAI. Views are personal

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Non-performing assets recovered via IBC rise 61% in 2019-20

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Non-performing assets (NPAs) recovered by scheduled commercial banks via the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (IBC) channel increased to about 61 per cent of the total amount recovered through various channels in 2019-20 against 56 per cent in 2018-19, according to latest Reserve Bank of India data.

IBC, under which recovery is incidental to rescue of companies, remained the dominant mode of recovery, according to RBI’s “Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India 2019-20.”

In absolute terms, of the total amount of ₹1,72,565 crore recovered through various channels in 2019-20, IBC route accounted for ₹1,05,773 crore. In 2018-19, of the total recovered amount of ₹1,18,647 crore, the recovery via IBC channel was ₹66,440 crore.

“Going forward, insolvency outcomes will hinge around uncertainties relating to Covid-19.

“The government has suspended any fresh initiation of insolvency proceedings in respect of defaults arising during one year commencing March 25, 2020 to shield companies impacted by Covid-19,” the central bank said.

The report observed that the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Interest Act, 2002, (SARFAESI) channel also emerged a major mode of recovery in terms of the amount recovered and the recovery rate, the report said.

Under SARFAESI, ₹52,563 crore was recovered in 2019-20 against ₹38,905 crore in 2018-19.

With the applicability of the SARFAESI Act extended to co-operative banks, recovery through this channel is expected to gain further traction, the report said.

Assets reconstruction companies

Apart from recovery through various resolution mechanisms, banks also clean up balance sheets through sale of NPAs to assets reconstruction companies (ARCs) for a quick exit.

During 2019-20, asset sales by SCBs to ARCs declined which could probably be due to SCBs opting for other resolution channels such as IBC and SARFAESI, RBI said.

The acquisition cost of ARCs as a proportion to the book value of assets declined suggesting lower realisable value of the assets, it added.

Apart from recovery through various resolution mechanisms, banks also clean up balance sheets through sale of NPAs to assets reconstruction companies (ARCs) for a quick exit.

During 2019-20, asset sales by SCBs to ARCs declined which could probably be due to SCBs opting for other resolution channels such as IBC and SARFAESI, RBI said.

The acquisition cost of ARCs as a proportion to the book value of assets declined suggesting lower realisable value of the assets, it added

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