Reserve Bank of India – Press Releases

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As announced in the ‘Statement on Developmental and Regulatory Policies’ issued as part of the Monetary Policy statement dated October 8, 2021, the Reserve Bank, in exercise of the powers conferred under Section 45 (L) read with 45 (M) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, has directed Deposit-taking NBFCs (NBFCs-D) with 10 or more branches and Non-Deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-ND) with asset size of Rs.5,000 crore and above having public customer interface to appoint Internal Ombudsman (IO) at the apex of their internal grievance redress mechanism within a period of six months from the date of issue of the direction, except for certain type of NBFCs as mentioned in para 2. The direction covers, inter-alia, the appointment/tenure, role and responsibilities, procedural guidelines, and oversight mechanism for the IO. All complaints that are partly or wholly rejected by the NBFC will be reviewed by the IO before the final decision of the NBFC is conveyed to the complainant. The IO will not entertain any complainants directly from members of public.

2. NBFCs not having public customer interface and certain types of NBFCs, viz., stand-alone Primary Dealers (PDs), NBFC – Infrastructure Finance Companies (NBFC-IFCs), Core Investment Companies (CICs), Infrastructure Debt Fund – Non-Banking Financial Companies (IDF-NBFCs), Non-Banking Financial Company – Account Aggregators (NBFC-AAs), NBFCs under Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, NBFCs in liquidation and NBFCs having only captive customers have been excluded from the requirement to appoint IOs.

3. The implementation of the IO mechanism will be monitored by the NBFC’s internal audit system apart from regulatory oversight by RBI.

(Yogesh Dayal)     
Chief General Manager

Press Release: 2021-2022/1198

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The Reserve Bank of India today released the November 2021 issue of its monthly Bulletin. The Bulletin includes five speeches, four articles and current statistics.

The four articles are: I. State of the Economy; II. Is the Phillips Curve in India Dead, Inert and Stirring to Life or Alive and Well?; III. Uncertainty and Disagreement among Professional Macroeconomic Forecasters; and IV. Changing Tides in the Indian Money Market.

I. State of the Economy

The global economic outlook remains shrouded in uncertainty with headwinds from multiple fronts. In India, the recovery gained strength though the speed and pace of improvement remains uneven across different sectors of the economy. Indicators of aggregate demand posit a brighter near-term outlook than before. On the supply side, the Rabi season has set in early on a positive note on the back of a record Kharif harvest and manufacturing is showing improvement in overall operating conditions, while services are in strong expansion mode. Overall monetary and credit conditions stay conducive for a durable economic recovery to take root.

II. Is the Phillips Curve in India Dead, Inert and Stirring to Life or Alive and Well?

The post-Global Financial Crisis period has seen a plethora of literature on the “health” of the most cited macroeconomic relationship –the Phillips Curve. Adding more essence to this heated global debate, this article examines the existence of the Phillips Curve in India by examining its time-variation and convexity. The findings from this paper confirm the existence of a convex Philips Curve relationship in India, though alive but stirring to life and convalescing from a period of flattening, which lasted for more than six years.

III. Uncertainty and Disagreement among Professional Macroeconomic Forecasters

This article analyses the responses received in the Reserve Bank’s bimonthly survey of professional forecasters (SPF) on major macroeconomic variables. The forecasts of output growth and inflation, particularly for 2020-21, were characterised by high uncertainty in the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic. The article dives into the fluctuations in short-term forecasts during the pandemic.

Highlights

  • The pandemic led to massive disruption in global as well as domestic economy causing uncertainty as reflected in large swings in forecasts of growth and inflation for 2020-21.

  • The pandemic induced lockdowns led to significant downward revision in the growth forecast for 2020-21 and subsequent gradual opening up of the economy led to improvement in the growth outlook.

  • Disagreement among the forecasters was high at the onset of the pandemic and generally moderated subsequently. Uncertainty of forecasts exhibited similar pattern as disagreement and declined with shorter forecast horizon.

  • The analysis portrays the existence of a significant association between uncertainty and disagreement; however, disagreement may not be a good proxy for uncertainty.

IV. Changing Tides in the Indian Money Market

Money market provides short-term capital to a wide class of financial entities and plays a key role in the transmission of monetary policy. This article reviews the important segments of the Indian money market in terms of volume, rate, microstructure, and dispersion of rates for the period from January-2016 to March-2021.

Highlights

  • The overnight money market volatility, in terms of volume-weighted rates, increased after the declaration of Covid-19 pandemic, and peaked in March-2020. The volatility declined subsequently. A shift away from the unsecured segment to secured segments was also witnessed after the declaration of the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • A study of the intraday market activity and network structure of the call money segment suggests increased portfolio diversification after the onset of the pandemic.

  • The constructed dispersion index (covering six segments of the money market), that serves as an empirical gauge of pass-through efficiency, suggests a frictionless market with efficient pass-through for the period from January-2020 to February-2020.

The dispersion index that peaked in March-2020 showed a decreasing trend at the end of the sample period considered. The sector-specific, institution-specific and instrument-specific liquidity measures undertaken by the Reserve Bank in the recent times have resulted in the stabilisation of the money market with the market adapting to the new normal.

Ajit Prasad           
Director, (Communications)

Press Release: 2021-2022/1197

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April 14, 2015




Dear All




Welcome to the refurbished site of the Reserve Bank of India.





The two most important features of the site are: One, in addition to the default site, the refurbished site also has all the information bifurcated functionwise; two, a much improved search – well, at least we think so but you be the judge.




With this makeover, we also take a small step into social media. We will now use Twitter (albeit one way) to send out alerts on the announcements we make and YouTube to place in public domain our press conferences, interviews of our top management, events, such as, town halls and of course, some films aimed at consumer literacy.




The site can be accessed through most browsers and devices; it also meets accessibility standards.



Please save the url of the refurbished site in your favourites as we will give up the existing site shortly and register or re-register yourselves for receiving RSS feeds for uninterrupted alerts from the Reserve Bank.



Do feel free to give us your feedback by clicking on the feedback button on the right hand corner of the refurbished site.



Thank you for your continued support.




Department of Communication

Reserve Bank of India


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BRICS: FROM ACRONYM TO GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWERHOUSE1

Professor Pami Dua, Director, Delhi School of Economics, Prof. Yogesh Singh, Vice Chancellor, University of Delhi, Prof. Sanghamitra Bandyopadhyay, Director, Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre, Prof. Chetan Ghate, Indian Statistical Institute, distinguished invitees and conference participants, I am honoured to be invited to deliver the inaugural keynote address for the conference on ‘Growth and Development in the BRICS Economies’ jointly organised by the Delhi School of Economics and the Indian Statistical Institute, Delhi Centre. The conference is timely and topical in view of India taking over the presidency of BRICS in 2021. The discussions in the conference and the signed papers to be presented will surely shine light on how the BRICS economies chart their course through the pandemic and into a post-pandemic future. My address is loosely divided into two parts, although I might be moving back and forth to tease out the inter-linkages. The first part will deal with the state of the BRICS economies and the immediate challenges that they face. This will be followed by an overview of the challenges confronting India, in view of the current BRICS presidency.

BRICS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY

The acronym BRIC is traced back to 2001 and widely attributed to Jim O’Neill, then Chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, but apparently there is some dispute about its origin. Be that as it may, the first formal meeting of BRIC, i.e. Brazil, Russia, India and China, represented by their Leaders took place in Yekaterinburg, Russia in 2009. South Africa joined in 2010 and completed the BRICS. Together the BRICS account for more than 40 per cent of the world’s population, a quarter of global GDP, a quarter of global direct foreign investment and close to a fifth of world trade. It is in this context that the BRICS are being regarded as an emerging global powerhouse.

The BRICS encompass a wide diversity as well as distinct similarities. They include the most populous nations as well as relatively sparsely lived ones, with different demographic profiles, especially in terms of population ageing, life expectancy and share of dependents. They also vary quite widely in terms of their financial development, with the proportion of adults owning bank accounts being taken as a measure of financial inclusion. The BRICS also share many common features – broadly similar stages of development; accelerating growth in a sustainable manner as a development strategy; emphasis on inclusivity and digitisation; and investing into climate resilience. It is with these characteristics that BRICS have come together to contribute to the development and prosperity of human societies all over the world and thereby to the global common good.

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) projects global GDP to turn around from an unprecedented decline of 3.1 per cent in 2020 and expand by 5.9 per cent in 2021. The BRICS are expected to be the most important engine of global recovery, contributing 42 per cent of global growth in 2021, which is more than the combined share of the next three growth drivers (the US; the Euro area; the UK). The BRICS are also a formidable force in world trade, accounting for about 16 per cent of world merchandise and services trade by value. They comprise both commodity exporters and importers, with country specialisations across a range of manufactures and services. Intra-BRICS trade is expanding robustly and has exhibited a degree of pandemic proofing – illustratively, India’s trade with BRICS partners has risen to USD 113.3 billion in the pandemic financial year 2020-21 (April-March), up from USD 110 billion in the pre-pandemic year of 2019-20. In 2021-22 so far, all the BRICS nations are posting robust export performances.

The BRICS nations are financially open economies and preferred habitats for capital flows. In recent years, they have also experienced sudden stops and reversals accentuated by portfolio flows. By contrast, all of them are also recipients of relatively stable foreign direct investment. In 2020, there was a retrenchment of capital flows across emerging market economies (EMEs). Among the BRICS, only India and South Africa were spared from net outflows. In 2021 so far, net capital flows continued to favour India and Brazil. In contrast to the situation at the time of the 2013 taper tantrum, the BRICS appear to be well fortified on the external front. Currently, the BRICS collectively hold 33 per cent of global foreign exchange reserves, with China, India and Russia among the top ten reserve holders of the world. Reserve adequacy measured by prospective import cover ranges between 7 and 19 months. China and Russia typically run current account surpluses, and hence the focus of financial markets is usually on BRICS current account deficit economies – Brazil, India and South Africa. India moved into modest current account surpluses in 2020 and 2021 so far, but this may not last in view of rising import demand.

BRICS IN A MULTILATERAL ROLE

The BRICS have been staunch champions of multilateralism, voting unanimously for quota and governance reforms at the IMF to make it more representative of global economic realities, especially the rising profile of EMEs. Together, they hold 14.8 per cent of the IMF’s quota resources that total SDR 476.4 billion and 14 per cent of voting power. In the World Bank, they have increased their share in the institution’s capital to 14.1 per cent, with a share of 13.4 per cent in voting power. Confronted with an impasse in future quota reform amidst a hostile and volatile international environment, the BRICS have turned creditors to the IMF to supplement its quota resources. The collective share of BRICS in the IMF’s new arrangements to borrow (NAB) is 16 per cent of a total of SDR 361 billion. Besides, each BRICS nation has signed bilateral borrowing arrangements (BBA) with the IMF cumulating to a share of 17 per cent of a total of SDR 135 billion. In addition, the BRICS have put in place swap lines under a contingent reserve arrangement or CRA amounting to USD 100 billion, which matches their combined share in IMF quotas and is counted as a part of the global financial safety net (GFSN).

The BRICS were impacted severely by the pandemic, with multiple waves of infections which continue to take their toll. In terms of total infections, three BRICS, viz. India, Brazil and Russia are among the top five affected nations in the world. In terms of seven days rolling averages, new infections have eased in all BRICS countries barring Russia, contained by the scale and speed of vaccination drives. In terms of vaccinations, however, there are wide divergences ranging between three quarters of the population being fully vaccinated in China and only a fifth in South Africa. Full vaccination is an immediate challenge for all the BRICS. Among the leading exporters of vaccines, China, Russia and India figure prominently. In the case of India, vaccine exports were temporarily halted when domestic infections surged. As infections came down, India has resumed exports of vaccines from October, including under the QUAD initiative. Under the QUAD initiative of producing at least 1 billion doses of vaccines for the Indo-Pacific region by the end of 2022, the vaccines will be produced in India with the US financing capacity expansion, Japan providing concessional loans to India and Australia giving last mile delivery support. In a strong expression of commitment to the QUAD initiative, India financed 50 per cent of the first consignment of 1 million doses in October.

MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS AND POLICY RESPONSES

As a consequence of the differentials in infections and vaccination as well as differences in monetary and fiscal policy support, the BRICS are faced with divergences in macroeconomic conditions. While China’s recovery has been quick and strong, the other BRICS are moving into positive growth territory since Q2:2021. Wider differences characterise inflation outcomes. While Brazil and Russia – both commodity exporters – are experiencing inflation rates much above target and tolerance levels, China has kept retail inflation low despite high producer price inflation. In South Africa, inflation is within the target range. In India, inflation breached the upper tolerance band in May, but strong supply side measures in the form of augmented access to imports and buffer stocks as well as measures to incentivise productivity have yielded results, bringing down inflation close to target in September and October 2021.

There is considerable similarity among the BRICS in terms of their monetary policy frameworks. Four of them have adopted inflation targeting. The numerical targets range around four per cent and all of them have tolerance bands barring Russia which aims to keep inflation close to four per cent. South Africa does not have a point target – it follows an inflation target range of 3 to 6 per cent. China has not adopted inflation targeting but keeps inflation low and stable below 3 per cent. All of them responded to the pandemic with large rate cuts and reserve requirement reductions. More recently, Brazil and Russia have completed the normalisation of policy accommodation and Brazil is into orthodox tightening. India, China and South Africa continue to maintain accommodative monetary policy stances.

Another common feature among BRICS has been their pandemic response in the form of large fiscal stimuli and additional spending and/or tax revenue forgone. As a consequence, fiscal positions in terms of the gross fiscal deficit/GDP ratio worsened through the pandemic. Russia was running a fiscal surplus ahead of the pandemic and hence there was fiscal headroom which could be used during the pandemic with the least stress on the fiscal accounts. Accordingly, fiscal risks have risen sharply with debt-GDP ratios in the range of 66 (China) – 99 (Brazil) per cent of GDP. As I mentioned earlier, Russia is an outlier, with its debt-GDP ratio below 20 per cent of GDP.

Medium term challenges for the BRICS arise in the context of climate risks and emission commitments which may engender energy shortages, technology gaps and hence pose risks to medium term growth and inflation, especially for countries with large total emissions. A more immediate challenge stems from elevated commodity prices for net importers like India although they confer terms of trade gains for net exporters like Brazil and Russia. For all the BRICS, rising food prices on account of natural calamities and demand-supply imbalances caused by the pandemic involve elevated inflation risks.

Within the BRICS, per capita income levels differ widely. Studies conducted in CAFRAL, the Reserve Bank of India’s center of excellence, show that per capita income is a significant determinant of credit ratings across all three external rating agencies (S&P; Moody’s; Fitch). All the BRICS are vulnerable to the middle-income trap, which refers to a situation in which they could fail to transition to a high-income economy due to rising costs and declining competitiveness. Investment and innovation are the two key ingredients for moving a middle-income economy into a high-income economy, and it is necessary to understand the macroeconomic factors that influence each of them in our economies.

MILESTONES AND DELIVERABLES

Since the BRICS came into existence in 2009-10, significant milestones have been passed in their journey together.

  • The New Development Bank (NDB) started functioning in 2015 and has approved about 80 projects in its member countries involving a portfolio of USD 30 billion in areas such as transport, water and sanitation, clean energy, digital infrastructure, social infrastructure and urban developments. Since September 2021, the NDB is approving new members (Uruguay; the UAE; Bangladesh). The NDB has set a target of USD 10 billion for COVID-related support of which more than USD 7 billion has already been disbursed.

  • The Contingent Reserve Arrangement or CRA is a mechanism with a total corpus of USD 100 billion to provide short-term swap support during balance of payment crises. The swaps have a delinked portion of 30 per cent which can be extended as emergency liquidity support and a linked portion of 70 per cent, which is contingent upon the requesting country(s) having an IMF programme in place.

  • The BRICS Strategic Economic Partnership 2021-2025 provides a roadmap for economic co-operation among the member countries, with a focus on trade and investment, the digital economy and sustainable development.

  • BRISC or BRICS Information Security Channel is a recent initiative started during Russia’s presidency in 2020, with a focus on information exchange on cyber security and cyber related incidents.

  • The BRICS Taskforce on public private partnership (PPP) and Infrastructure is another initiative to establish a forum to discuss various aspects related to co-operation in infrastructure. In 2021, the focus is on social infrastructure (health, education).

  • BRICS Payments Task Force (BPTF) is a central bank initiative to promote co-operation in payments system, including proposal on cross-border payments.

  • BRICS Business Council has been created as a platform to promote and strengthen business, trade and investment ties amongst the business communities of the BRICS and ensure that there is regular dialogue between them and the governments of the BRICS countries.

  • The BRICS Women’s Business Alliance (WBA) aims at promoting women’s entrepreneurship in the BRICS countries.

  • The BRICS Academic Forum (BAF) is a platform for deliberations and discussions among the leading academic institutions of BRICS countries, seeking ideas and solutions on numerous social, environmental and educational issues.

  • The BRICS Think Tanks Council (BTTC) was initiated in 2013 to enhance cooperation in research and capacity building, among academic communities of BRICS countries.

  • BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform promotes energy-based sustainable development, sharing of advanced energy technologies, expansion of cooperation on educational programmes, exchange of statistical data and plans on the development of national energy systems, and information on best practices and regulatory frameworks in the energy sector. The platform also aims at creating synergies in BRICS energy co-operation across various platforms.

  • The BRICS Environmentally Sound Technology (BEST) Platform, launched in 2015, aims to facilitate accumulation and exchange of experience/information on best available practices and environmentally friendly (“green”) technologies to achieve the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

  • The Report on Digital Financial Inclusion puts together initiatives, innovations and reforms undertaken in the BRICS countries in the area of financial inclusion by leveraging digital technology tools. The Report also maps these efforts against the G-20 High-Level Policy Guidelines on digital financial inclusion.

Under India’s presidency, six projects have already been taken forward to completion:

  • The e-booklet on Information Security Regulations and the Compendium of BRICS Best Practices on Information Security Risks cover information security regulations and best practices across BRICS jurisdictions, with the objective of strengthening cyber incidents management systems.

  • The CRA Evaluation Report covers all the issues and recommendations arising from this year’s CRA test run as well as past test runs conducted since 2018.

  • The first BRICS Collaborative Study ‘COVID-19: Headwinds and Tailwinds for Balance of Payments of BRICS’ highlights the severe economic disruptions caused by the pandemic globally and in the BRICS economies, resulting in sharp current account adjustments as well as volatility in capital flows.

  • The BRICS Economic Bulletin for 2021 is on the theme ‘Navigating the Ongoing Pandemic: The BRICS Experience of Resilience and Recovery’. It covers divergent economic recoveries, inflation risks, fiscal stress, external sector performance, and financial sector vulnerabilities.

  • In 2021, the test run of the IMF-linked portion of the CRA was conducted for the first time. Modalities of co-operation with the IMF are being finalized.

  • Among the deliverables over the rest of the year, the BRICS Bond Fund (BBF), which is a joint initiative of BRICS central banks with a view to developing local bond markets in member countries, is now close to completion.

  • BRICS Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) adopted a ‘BRICS Statement on Global Economic Outlook and Responding to COVID-19 Crisis’ in August 2021. The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors agreed to continue efforts to strengthen BRICS cooperation towards achieving strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive economic growth in a post-pandemic world and welcomed the sharing of policy experiences by BRICS countries on their domestic economic responses to the pandemic.

  • The MSME Roundtable 2021 has helped enhance BRICS cooperation with a view to development of MSMEs integrating them into global value chains.

  • In 2021, BRICS Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters was finalised.

CHALLENGES CONFRONTING THE CHAIR

Let me now turn to the challenges facing India in its year of the BRICS presidency.

GDP growth is widely used as an indicator of economic progress of a country. If one looks back over the last 75 years, Bai-Perron structural break point tests reveal that India’s growth trajectory has gone through three phases. Up to the end of the 1970s, India averaged trend GDP growth of 3.5 per cent – the so called Hindu rate of growth – which has been associated with inward-looking policies adopted over that period. Trend growth picked up to 5.5 per cent during 1980–2002 as liberalisation and opening up occurred. Thereafter, GDP growth rose to an average of close to 7 per cent over the period 2003-20 till the pandemic arrived. In 2020-21, GDP declined by 7.3 per cent, among the deepest contractions worldwide in that year.

What are the growth drivers in India? It turns out that India’s growth is led by households – private consumption expenditure – though its share in GDP has come down from above 75 per cent in 1960s to about 55 per cent in recent years. There have been phases of export-led and investment-led growth, which could not be sustained, but they did provide turning points in the growth path.

The KLEMS2 database, so assiduously built up by the Delhi School of Economics for the Reserve Bank of India, reveals that capital accumulation is the largest contributor – about 60 per cent – to India’s growth. Therefore, the investment rate (total investment/GDP) is regarded as the most important lever of growth in India. A striking feature is that our growth is home grown – investment is financed primarily by domestic savings, with capital inflows from abroad playing only a supplemental role. Another noteworthy feature is that the saving rate has started slowing down after the global financial crisis (GFC). Eventually, this pulled down the investment rate from 2012-13. Reversing this trend is critical to achieve higher growth.

The current account deficit (CAD) in the BoP (X-M) determines how much of net capital inflows into the country can be absorbed or used for growth. Our experience has been that India can sustain a current account deficit of 2.5-3.0 per cent without getting into an external sector crisis. In fact, in a telling reminder of this fact, a record increase in gold imports took the current account deficit above this Plimsoll line to historically high levels during 2011-13. India faced the taper tantrum and was labelled as among the fragile five3.

After an impressive average export growth of around 20 per cent in the 2000s which also coincided with a pick-up in openness of the economy to trade and finance and a rise in the trend growth of GDP, export growth dropped from 2015 onwards. Rising trade protectionism took its toll, and this period is also associated with GDP growth deceleration. The robust recovery in world trade in 2021 so far has brought with it a renewed sense of optimism about exports acting again as an engine of growth. India’s exports are progressing fast towards the annual target of US$400 billion set for 2021-22. In H1:2021-22, the actual export level was already half of the target. Measures such as production-liked incentive (PLI) scheme are expected to boost exports4. Financial openness is also improving, consistent with trade openness – India bucked the global trend and recorded highest-ever inward FDI to the tune of US$ 82.0 billion in 2020-21.

India has a bank-led financing system and, therefore, bank credit growth is a bellwether indicator of the financing challenges to growth. In recent years – since 2017 – there has been a slowdown in bank credit, especially to industry. This is largely attributable to the stress in banks’ balance sheet due to a large overhang of non-performing assets (NPAs), traced to the credit boom in mid-2000s. Global overcapacity and the slowing down of the economy led to a turning of the investment cycle, project delays and cost overruns. Bank defaults increased, and stressed banks became reluctant to take new lending risks. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the GFC, banks were allowed to restructure assets and treat them as ‘standard’ advances but with additional provisions. Withdrawal of regulatory forbearance on restructuring of advances from April 2015 and a subsequent asset quality review (AQR) led to more realistic recognition of gross NPAs (GNPAs). After reaching a peak of 11.5 per cent in March 2018 the GNPA ratio has been declining, mainly due to resolution of stressed assets under the insolvency and bankruptcy code (IBC) process and the Reserve Bank’s revised framework for resolution of stressed assets. Before the onset of COVID-19, the GNPA ratio banks in India stood at 8.3 per cent at end-March 2020. It fell further to 7.5 per cent by the end of March 2021, showing that banks used the pandemic period to improve recoveries and write off intractable loans while making higher provisions in their balance sheets. With banks in a risk averse mode, non-banking sources (both domestic and foreign) are contributing as much or even more in recent years to the flow of resources to India’s commercial sector.

The agglutination of supply disruptions, the health crisis, an unparalleled mass migration and a hostile global environment has caused a considerable loss of output – over a tenth of annual GDP of a normal year. With a growth of 9.5 per cent in 2021-22 (according to the Reserve Bank of India’s projections), India’s GDP would be a shade above its level in 2019-20. Recovering this lost output may take several years – this I will regard as the second most important challenge. Earlier in the context of the BRICs, I had pointed out that speedy vaccination of the entire population is the most important challenge.

The Quarterly Employment Survey (QES) of April 2021 of the Labour Bureau, covering 9 sectors and 85 per cent of organised sector employment, shows that between March 21, 2020 and July 1, 2020, i.e. the lock down period, all sectors suffered a decline in the number of employees. Only 34 per cent of units could function during March 25, 2020 to June 30, 2020, with the exception of the health and financial sectors. As regards wage loss, the impact on the organised sector was soft as 80.7 per cent of employees received full wages and only 2.7 per cent went without wages. Putting people back to work, reskilling them to respond to the changing environment and enhancing their productivity is the third challenge. Out of 132 countries, India is ranked at 100 in terms of labour productivity.

India’s population at 1.38 billion is the world’s youngest at 28.4 years, but aging will close the demographic dividend by 2045. By 2027, India will be the most populous country in the world (1.47 Billion), according to the United Nations World Population Prospects. This structure of the population can be best represented by the age dependency ratio – the ratio of the dependent population (0-14 years and 65+ years) to total working-age population: a lower value of the ratio implies a more productive population. India’s age dependency ratio has been declining and is likely to decline further till 2025 after which it may remain stagnant till 2040 and increase thereafter. A comparison of India’s working-age population as a ratio of the total population or WAP ratio shows that India stands at an advantageous position – India’s WAP ratio will increase till 2045 even as it is declining elsewhere in the world. Making the most of this demographic dividend is fourth major challenge facing the Indian economy.

India was one of the fragile five countries in 2013 as external sector viability deteriorated during the taper tantrum. Relative to macroeconomic configurations in 2013, India is better positioned currently as its macroeconomic fundamentals have improved significantly and external sector indicators point to the availability of enough cushions to manage external shocks. I present this strength as a challenge because the international environment is turning hostile, with geopolitical tensions, the long-lasting scars of COVID and the inevitability of climate change. Furthermore, countries all over the world are contemplating shifting their policy stances away from a pandemic mode to a more normal one. This will involve global spillovers to which India cannot be immune. Hence external sector viability is critical.

India is currently one of the fastest-growing major economies in the world. In purchasing power parity (PPP) terms, India is the third largest economy in the world. Projections show that by 2040 India will be the second largest economy in the world. This, in my view, is the final challenge – preparing, with the BRICS, to be a global economic powerhouse.

Thank you.


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The Reserve Bank of India will conduct a Variable Rate Reverse Repo auction on November 16, 2021, Tuesday, as under:

Sl. No. Notified Amount
(₹ crore)
Tenor
(day)
Window Timing Date of Reversal
1 2,00,000 7 10:30 AM to 11:00 AM November 23, 2021
(Tuesday)

2. The operational guidelines for the auction as given in the Reserve Bank’s Press Release 2019-2020/1947 dated February 13, 2020 will remain the same.

Ajit Prasad           
Director (Communications)

Press Release: 2021-2022/1195

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RBI/2021-2022/126
CO.CEPD.PRS.No.S874/13-01-008/2021-2022

November 15, 2021

The Chairman/Managing Director & CEO
a) NBFCs-D with 10 or more branches, and
b) NBFCs-ND with asset size of Rs 5,000 crore and above (excluding NBFCs given in para 3 of this direction)

Madam/Dear Sir,

Appointment of Internal Ombudsman by Non-Banking Financial Companies

In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 45 (L) read with 45 (M) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, Reserve Bank of India (RBI) being satisfied that it is in public interest and in the interest of conduct of business relating to Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs), directs NBFCs registered with RBI under Section 45-IA of the RBI Act, 1934, fulfilling the criteria given below, to appoint an Internal Ombudsman (IO).

2. NBFCs fulfilling the following criteria as on date would be required to appoint the IO:

a) Deposit-taking NBFCs (NBFCs-D) with 10 or more branches.

b) Non-Deposit taking NBFCs (NBFCs-ND) with asset size of Rs.5,000 crore and above and having public customer interface.

3. The following types of NBFCs will be excluded from the applicability of this direction:

  1. Stand-alone Primary Dealer;

  2. Non-Banking Financial Company – Infrastructure Finance Company (NBFC-IFC);

  3. Core Investment Company (CIC);

  4. Infrastructure Debt Fund – Non-Banking Financial Company (IDF-NBFC);

  5. Non-Banking Financial Company – Account Aggregator (NBFC-AA);

  6. NBFC under Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process;

  7. NBFC in liquidation;

  8. NBFC having only captive customers.

4. An NBFC shall be required to comply with the provisions of this direction as follows:

a) NBFC fulfilling the criteria (para 2 above) as on date – within six months;

b) NBFC fulfilling the criteria post issue of this direction and NBFC commencing operations after the issue of this direction – within six months of attaining the specified criteria, as may be applicable.

5. Any NBFC which is covered by this direction shall continue to have an IO for a period of three years after the company falls below the thresholds (para 2 above). If the term of the incumbent IO ends before this three-year period, the NBFC, with the prior approval of RBI, may not appoint another IO.

6. Appointment of the IO:

a) The person to be appointed as IO shall fulfil the following prerequisites:

  1. The person shall be either a retired or a serving officer, not below the rank of Deputy General Manager or equivalent in any financial sector regulatory body/any other NBFC/bank, with necessary skills and experience of minimum of seven years of working in areas such as non-banking finance, banking, financial sector regulation or supervision, or consumer protection.

  2. The person shall not have worked/be working in the NBFC/companies in the Group1 to which the NBFC belongs in which he/she is being appointed as IO.

  3. The person appointed as IO shall not be above the age of 70 years at any point of time during the tenure as IO.

(b) The NBFC may appoint more than one IO depending on the number of complaints received/branch network. In such a case, the NBFC shall define the jurisdiction of each IO.

(c) The Principal Nodal Officer/Nodal Officer, liaising with the offices of RBI Ombudsman, or any other official of the NBFC, shall not act as the IO or vice versa.

7. Tenure of the IO: The tenure of the IO shall be for a fixed term of not less than three years, but not exceeding five years and the same shall be indicated in the appointment letter. The IO shall not be eligible for reappointment or for extension of tenure in the same NBFC.

a) The NBFC shall undertake the process of fresh appointment well in advance to fill the vacancy before the expiry of the incumbent IO and ensure that the post of the IO does not remain vacant at any point of time.

b) The IO shall not be removed before the completion of the contracted term without the explicit approval of the Reserve Bank. In case the vacancy arises on account of reasons beyond the control of the NBFC (such as death, resignation, incapacitation, terminal illness, etc.), the NBFC shall appoint a new IO by following the procedure of appointment as indicated at para 6 of this direction, within three months from the date of the vacancy arising.

8. Secretariat and cost of the office of the IO: The NBFC shall depute such number of its officers and/or other staff and make available such infrastructure to the office of the IO as may be considered necessary for its effective functioning.

a) The Board of the NBFC shall fix the emoluments/facilities/benefits of the IO, which should be appropriate keeping in view the stature and position of the IO being at the apex of the grievance redress mechanism of the NBFC, and the need to attract experienced persons with requisite expertise.

b) The emoluments/facilities/benefits of the IO, once determined, shall not be changed during the currency of his/her tenure.

9. Role and responsibilities of the IO: The IO shall deal only with the complaints that have already been examined by the NBFC but have been partly or wholly rejected by the NBFC. In other words, the IO shall not handle complaints received directly from the customers or members of the public.

a) The following types of complaints shall be outside the purview of this direction and shall not be handled by the IO:

  1. Complaints related to frauds, misappropriation etc., except those resulting from deficiency in service, if any, on the part of the NBFC;

  2. Complaints/references relating to (a) internal administration, (b) human resources, (c) pay and emoluments of staff;

  3. References in the nature of suggestions and commercial decisions of the NBFC;

  4. Complaints which have been decided by or are already pending in other for a such as Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, courts, etc.

b) The complaints that are outside the purview of this direction shall be immediately referred back to the NBFC by the IO.

c) The IO shall examine the complaints based on records available with the NBFC, including any documents submitted by the complainant, and comments/clarifications furnished by the NBFC to the specific queries of the IO. The IO may seek additional information from the complainant through the NBFC.

d) The NBFC shall furnish all records/documents sought by the IO to enable expeditious redress/resolution of customer grievances.

e) The IO may hold meetings with the concerned functionaries/departments of the NBFC and seek any record/document available with the NBFC that is necessary for examining the complaint/decision.

f) The IO shall periodically analyse the pattern of all complaints received against the NBFC, such as product-wise, category-wise, consumer group-wise, geographical location-wise, etc. and provide inputs to the NBFC for policy intervention, if any.

g) The IO shall not represent the NBFC in legal cases before any court or fora or authority.

h) The IO shall report to the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer of the NBFC administratively, and to the Board functionally.

10. Procedural guidelines for NBFCs regarding complaints referred to the IO by the NBFC: The NBFC shall formulate a Standard Operating Procedure approved by its Board and establish a system of auto-escalation of all complaints that are partly or wholly rejected by the NBFC’s internal grievance redress mechanism to the IO for a final decision.

a) The NBFC shall internally escalate all such complaints to the IO within a period of three weeks from the date of receipt of the complaint. The IO and the NBFC shall ensure that the final decision is communicated to the complainant within 30 days from the date of receipt of the complaint by the NBFC.

b) In case the NBFC has a complaint management software, it shall provide to the IO read-only access to the system and enable uploading of the decision of the IO.

c) The IO shall also have read-only access to the Reserve Bank’s Complaint Management System to enable the IO to keep track of: (a) the cases forwarded by the offices of RBI Ombudsmen, (b) decisions of the RBI Ombudsmen, and (c) where applicable, the decision of the Appellate Authority under the RBI Ombudsman scheme.

d) The decision of the IO shall be binding on the NBFC, except in cases where the NBFC has obtained approval for disagreeing with the IO’s decision as stated in sub-para 10 (f).

e) In case the IO upholds the decision of the NBFC to reject/partly reject the complaint, the reply to the customer should explicitly state the fact that the complaint has been examined by the IO and, for the reasons stated in the reply, the decision of the NBFC has been upheld.

f) In case the IO overrules the decision of the NBFC to reject/partly reject the complaint, the NBFC can disagree with the decision of the IO with the approval of the Executive Director/Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer as may be applicable. In such cases, the reply to the complainant shall explicitly state the fact that the complaint was examined by the IO and the decision of the NBFC was overruled by the IO in favour of the complainant; however, the NBFC, with the approval of the Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer, has disagreed with the decision of the IO. All such cases shall be subsequently reviewed on a quarterly basis by the Board of the NBFC.

g) In case of complaints that are fully or partly rejected even after examination by the IO, the NBFC shall necessarily advise to the complainant as part of the reply that he/she can approach the RBI Ombudsman for redress (if the complaint falls under the RBI Ombudsman mechanism) along with complete details. The advice should include the link to Reserve Bank’s portal (cms.rbi.org.in) for online filing of customer complaints.

h) The NBFC shall use the analysis of complaints handled by the IO in their training programmes/conferences to raise awareness among the frontline staff about, inter-alia, the pattern of complaints being received in the NBFC, their root causes, remedial measures and expected action on the part of frontline staff. The IO may also be associated with such trainings, where necessary.

i) While assessing the performance of the IO, in addition to the level of pendency etc., the NBFC shall also consider the number of cases where substantive differences were observed between the decisions of the IO vis-à-vis those given by the RBI Ombudsman subsequently.

j) The NBFC shall disseminate the guidelines/instructions regarding the role of the IO among its staff while communicating the appointment of the IO in the organization (all branches and administrative offices).

k) The NBFC shall not provide the contact details of the IO in the public domain as the IO shall not handle complaints received directly from the customers.

l) The decision of the IO shall mandatorily be included in the information submitted by the NBFC to the office of the RBI Ombudsman while replying to/furnishing documents to the office of the RBI Ombudsman.

m) If the opinion of the IO is not available with the NBFC when the complainant approaches the RBI Ombudsman, the NBFC should obtain the views of the IO and include the same in its submission to the office of the RBI Ombudsman.

n) The IO shall function from the Head/Corporate Office of the NBFC.

11. Reporting to RBI: The NBFC shall put in place a system of periodic reporting of information to Reserve Bank as indicated below:

a) On a quarterly basis, the total number of complaints received, the number of partly or wholly rejected complaints and the number of complaints escalated to the IO, within 15 days from the end of the quarter;

b) On an annual basis:

  1. the number of cases where the decision of IO has been rejected (with the approval of Managing Director/Chief Executive Officer), to be submitted by April 15; and

  2. the number of cases closed by the IO, and age-wise number of cases where the NBFC was yet to implement the decision of the IO, to be submitted by April 15.

The reporting format is given in Annex.

c) The NBFC shall, within five working days of appointment of the IO, furnish the details of the IO to the Chief General Manager, Consumer Education and Protection Department, Reserve Bank of India, Central Office, 1st Floor, Amar Building, Sir P M Road, Mumbai – 400 001 (email: cgmcepd@rbi.org.in) in the following format:

  1. Name of the Internal Ombudsman;

  2. Details of the last position held/organization name;

  3. Date and period of appointment;

  4. Brief professional profile, including previous exposure to financial services; and

  5. Contact details, i.e., address, phone/fax numbers, email address, etc.

12. Board Oversight: The IO shall furnish periodic reports to the Board of the NBFC as may be specified by it, preferably at quarterly intervals, but not less than bi-annually.

13. Audit: The internal audit of the NBFC shall cover the implementation of this direction.

a) The audit shall, inter-alia, cover aspects relating to:

  1. the infrastructure (space, IT infrastructure, human resources, etc.) provided to the IO;

  2. adherence with various timelines indicated in the direction;

  3. support provided by the NBFC to the IO for redress of the complaint; (refer para 9 (c) and (d))

b) The scope of the internal audit shall exclude any assessment of the correctness of decisions taken by the IO.

14. Supervisory Oversight: The areas relating to customer service and customer grievance redress, as well as the implementation of this direction, shall be a part of the risk assessment and supervisory review undertaken by the Reserve Bank. Further, Reserve Bank will review the cases where the decision of the IO has not been accepted by the NBFC and the aggrieved customer approaches the RBI Ombudsman, for assessing the effectiveness of the internal grievance redress mechanism of the NBFC and initiating corrective actions as it may deem fit.

Yours faithfully,

(Ranjana Sahajwala)
Chief General Manager


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A. Source Security 5.09% GS 2022 5.09% GS 2022 8.35% GS 2022 8.15% GS 2022 8.13% GS 2022 8.13% GS 2022
B. Notified Amount (amount in ₹ cr) 4,000 4,000 4,000 8,000 4,000 6,000
Destination Security GOI FRB 2031 GOI FRB 2034 7.57% GS 2033 7.57% GS 2033 GOI FRB 2031 GOI FRB 2034
C. i. No. of offers received 22 27 13 5 5 7
ii. Total amount of Source Security offered (Face value in ₹ cr) 6050.00 5180.00 905.00 4025.00 4890.00 4102.082
iii. No of offers accepted 5 3 0 0 3 5
iv. Total amount of source security accepted (Face value in ₹ cr) 4000.00 2950.00 0 0 2890.00 3100.00
v. Total amount of destination security issued (Face value in ₹ cr) 3,995.253 2985.305 0 0 2977.245 3236.335
vi. Cut-off price/yield for destination security 100.62/4.7398 99.32/4.8655 NA NA 100.62/4.7398 99.30/4.8676

Ajit Prasad            
Director (Communications)

Press Release: 2021-2022/1194

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(Amount in ₹ crore, Rate in Per cent)

  Volume
(One Leg)
Weighted
Average Rate
Range
A. Overnight Segment (I+II+III+IV) 0.00
     I. Call Money 0.00
     II. Triparty Repo 0.00
     III. Market Repo 0.00
     IV. Repo in Corporate Bond 0.00
B. Term Segment      
     I. Notice Money** 0.00
     II. Term Money@@ 0.00
     III. Triparty Repo 0.00
     IV. Market Repo 0.00
     V. Repo in Corporate Bond 0.00
  Auction Date Tenor (Days) Maturity Date Amount Current Rate /
Cut off Rate
C. Liquidity Adjustment Facility (LAF) & Marginal Standing Facility (MSF)
I. Today’s Operations
1. Fixed Rate          
     (i) Repo          
    (ii) Reverse Repo Sun, 14/11/2021 1 Mon, 15/11/2021 4,582.00 3.35
    (iii) Special Reverse Repo~          
    (iv) Special Reverse Repoψ          
2. Variable Rate&          
  (I) Main Operation          
     (a) Reverse Repo          
  (II) Fine Tuning Operations          
     (a) Repo          
     (b) Reverse Repo          
3. MSF Sun, 14/11/2021 1 Mon, 15/11/2021 10.00 4.25
4. Special Long-Term Repo Operations (SLTRO) for Small Finance Banks (SFBs)£          
5. Net liquidity injected from today’s operations
[injection (+)/absorption (-)]*
      -4,572.00  
II. Outstanding Operations
1. Fixed Rate          
    (i) Repo          
    (ii) Reverse Repo Sat, 13/11/2021 2 Mon, 15/11/2021 3,750.00 3.35
  Fri, 12/11/2021 3 Mon, 15/11/2021 243,661.00 3.35
    (iii) Special Reverse Repo~ Wed, 03/11/2021 15 Thu, 18/11/2021 1,158.00 3.75
    (iv) Special Reverse Repoψ Wed, 03/11/2021 15 Thu, 18/11/2021 291.00 3.75
2. Variable Rate&          
  (I) Main Operation          
     (a) Reverse Repo Wed, 03/11/2021 15 Thu, 18/11/2021 434,492.00 3.99
  (II) Fine Tuning Operations          
     (a) Repo          
     (b) Reverse Repo Tue, 09/11/2021 7 Tue, 16/11/2021 200,015.00 3.95
  Tue, 02/11/2021 28 Tue, 30/11/2021 50,007.00 3.97
3. MSF Sat, 13/11/2021 2 Mon, 15/11/2021 62.00 4.25
  Fri, 12/11/2021 3 Mon, 15/11/2021 125.00 4.25
4. Long-Term Repo Operations# Mon, 17/02/2020 1095 Thu, 16/02/2023 499.00 5.15
  Mon, 02/03/2020 1094 Wed, 01/03/2023 253.00 5.15
  Mon, 09/03/2020 1093 Tue, 07/03/2023 484.00 5.15
  Wed, 18/03/2020 1094 Fri, 17/03/2023 294.00 5.15
5. Targeted Long Term Repo Operations^ Fri, 27/03/2020 1092 Fri, 24/03/2023 12,236.00 4.40
  Fri, 03/04/2020 1095 Mon, 03/04/2023 16,925.00 4.40
  Thu, 09/04/2020 1093 Fri, 07/04/2023 18,042.00 4.40
  Fri, 17/04/2020 1091 Thu, 13/04/2023 20,399.00 4.40
6. Targeted Long Term Repo Operations 2.0^ Thu, 23/04/2020 1093 Fri, 21/04/2023 7,950.00 4.40
7. On Tap Targeted Long Term Repo Operations Mon, 22/03/2021 1095 Thu, 21/03/2024 5,000.00 4.00
  Mon, 14/06/2021 1096 Fri, 14/06/2024 320.00 4.00
  Mon, 30/08/2021 1095 Thu, 29/08/2024 50.00 4.00
  Mon, 13/09/2021 1095 Thu, 12/09/2024 200.00 4.00
  Mon, 27/09/2021 1095 Thu, 26/09/2024 600.00 4.00
  Mon, 04/10/2021 1095 Thu, 03/10/2024 350.00 4.00
8. Special Long-Term Repo Operations (SLTRO) for Small Finance Banks (SFBs)£ Mon, 17/05/2021 1095 Thu, 16/05/2024 400.00 4.00
Tue, 15/06/2021 1095 Fri, 14/06/2024 490.00 4.00
Thu, 15/07/2021 1093 Fri, 12/07/2024 750.00 4.00
Tue, 17/08/2021 1095 Fri, 16/08/2024 250.00 4.00
Wed, 15/09/2021 1094 Fri, 13/09/2024 150.00 4.00
D. Standing Liquidity Facility (SLF) Availed from RBI$       21,695.80  
E. Net liquidity injected from outstanding operations [injection (+)/absorption (-)]*     -825,849.2  
F. Net liquidity injected (outstanding including today’s operations) [injection (+)/absorption (-)]*     -830,421.2  
G. Cash Reserves Position of Scheduled Commercial Banks
     (i) Cash balances with RBI as on 14/11/2021 625,856.56  
  13/11/2021 629,926.60  
     (ii) Average daily cash reserve requirement for the fortnight ending 19/11/2021 634,320.00  
H. Government of India Surplus Cash Balance Reckoned for Auction as on¥ 12/11/2021 0.00  
I. Net durable liquidity [surplus (+)/deficit (-)] as on 22/10/2021 1,179,109.00  
@ Based on Reserve Bank of India (RBI) / Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL).
– Not Applicable / No Transaction.
** Relates to uncollateralized transactions of 2 to 14 days tenor.
@@ Relates to uncollateralized transactions of 15 days to one year tenor.
$ Includes refinance facilities extended by RBI.
& As per the Press Release No. 2019-2020/1900 dated February 06, 2020.
* Net liquidity is calculated as Repo+MSF+SLF-Reverse Repo.
# As per the Press Release No. 2020-2021/287 dated September 04, 2020.
^ As per the Press Release No. 2020-2021/605 dated November 06, 2020.
As per the Press Release No. 2020-2021/520 dated October 21, 2020, Press Release No. 2020-2021/763 dated December 11, 2020, Press Release No. 2020-2021/1057 dated February 05, 2021 and Press Release No. 2021-2022/695 dated August 13, 2021.
¥ As per the Press Release No. 2014-2015/1971 dated March 19, 2015.
£  As per the Press Release No. 2021-2022/181 dated May 07, 2021 and Press Release No. 2021-2022/1023 dated October 11, 2021.
~ As per the Press Release No. 2021-2022/177 dated May 07, 2021.
ψ As per the Press Release No. 2021-2022/323 dated June 04, 2021.
Ajit Prasad            
Director (Communications)
Press Release: 2021-2022/1193

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